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Education1. Introduction
The Global Financial Crisis has led to a signiﬁcant increase in
unemployment after a long expansionary period. Aggregate unemploy-
ment in the European Union was 9.2% in 1999, moved down to 7.2%
in 2007, and rose to 10.2 in 2014. In the euro area, it decreased from
9.7 to 7.5 and then rose to 11.6% over the same years. Within the
European aggregates, however, there are wide differences in the
unemployment behaviour between countries.
Unsurprisingly, the European periphery countries present the worst
unemployment behaviour (Fig. 1). At the start of the EMU, for example,
Greece and Spain had unemployment rates around 12 and 14%, not far
away from the 9% in Germany in 1999. Since then, however, while in
the Scandinavian and continental European countries unemployment
rates have hardly changed across expansion (1999–2007) and crisis
(2008–2014), they have doubled in the periphery (Ireland, Portugal,
Spain and Greece).These developments have raised concerns about the persistence of
high levels of unemployment (OECD, 2011, 2014) and its social and
economic consequences: widespread deterioration of human capital,
discouragement and labour market withdraw, effects on government
budget and standards of living. These concerns are not however new.
The seriousness of the high and persistent European unemployment
problem has long been recognized, and countless theoretical and
empirical studies have been undertaken to determine its causes
(Layard et al., 1991; Bean, 1994; Ljungqvist and Sargent, 1998; IMF,
1999; Blanchard, 2006, among many others).
However, most of these studies focus on the aggregate unemploy-
ment rate. As shown in Fig. 2, youth unemployment rates may be
characterised by different dynamics. Note, for example, that the rates
in 2014 were larger than those of aggregate unemployment in all
countries with no exception, both in 1999 and 2014. A second notewor-
thy feature is that unemployment increases were larger in youth unem-
ployment in all economies with the exception of France and Norway.
More precisely, the largest increases in the youth unemployment rate
took place inGreece, Portugal and Spain (between 20 and27 percentage
points), followed by Ireland, Italy and Luxembourg (around 15
percentage points), and Sweden (10.6 percentage points). Note that
Fig. 1. Unemployment rates (%).
Source: Eurostat.
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Sweden it almost doubled as it did in Austria.
In view of these differences, a disaggregated analysis of unemploy-
ment by considering speciﬁcally the youth and adult rates may uncover
signiﬁcant speciﬁc patterns, and thus be useful to reﬁne some of the
generic policy recommendations aiming at the restructuring of the
so called unfriendly labour market institutions (employment and
unemployment protection legislation, union power, ﬁscal wedges).
This would not imply neglecting such policies, but certainly would call
for group-speciﬁc measures in case different dynamics exist.
Time series analysis has been widely used to test among unem-
ployment theories. A ﬁrst wave of studies were concerned with the
degree of integration of unemployment series. If unemployment
could be characterised as a unit root process, empirical support
would be given to the hysteresis hypotheses (Blanchard and
Summers, 1986, 1987), under which temporary shocks have perma-
nent effects. At the other extreme, an order of integration close to
zero would endorse the NAIRU theory (Layard et al., 1991) according
to which shocks cause short departures from equilibrium and poli-
cies should focus on lowering this equilibrium rather than reducing
persistence (as under the hysteresis hypothesis). A more ﬂexible
approach, such as the Structuralist one proposed by Phelps (1994),
considered the possibility of infrequent shocks that would cause regime
changes in unemployment.Fig. 2. Youth unemplo
Source: Eurostat.Our study departs from this tradition of unemployment time series
analysis (Narayan and Smyth, 2004; Valadkhani and Smyth, 2015)
as we take a univariate approach to examine the nature of trends in
unemployment of European countries. Our objective, however, is not
to contribute to the extant research on unemployment hysteresis, but
to measure the trends in unemployment, and disaggregate the analysis
by examining youth unemployment as well, which happens to be a
contentious issue. This involves detecting whether there is a case of
breaking trends and how the trends are measured within regimes
demarcated by the break points.
Accordingly, this paper aims at identifying potential breaks in
European unemployment due to the occurrence of single deﬁnitive
events: the settlement of amonetary union in 1999 and theEuro/ﬁnancial
crisis in 2008–2009, which was followed by an intensive and extensive
reform process. In this paper we seek to answer pertinent questions
such as: Has the adoption of the single currency contributed to the large
distribution of unemployment rates across the euro zone area? Has the
euro crisis contributed to an increase in structural unemployment? If so,
for which countries? The above questions can be analysed by the robust
detection anddate stamping of structural breaks in unemployment across
euro area countries. For example, structural breaks located around the
introduction of the euro could appear in peripheral countries, but not in
core countries, could be interpreted as a signal that the adoption of the
single currency had asymmetric effects on the unemployment behaviouryment rates (%).
1 The ﬁnding of structural breaks and non-signiﬁcant slope changes should be in princi-
ple associated to the need of demand-side and growth oriented policies on account of the
absence of evidence of a change in the equilibrium unemployment rate. Nevertheless this
is, in fact, an intermediate case in which the statistical results are in between the two neat
cases leading to relatively safe recommendations. To the extent that this intermediate po-
sition is highly dependent on the statistical robustness of the results, these cases should be
interpreted with more caution than the others (see Tables 1 and 2).
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interpreted as a divergence effect in unemployment arising from the
adoption of the euro. Rather, as an example, it may signal the fact that
peripheral countries are catching-up to the core countries level in terms
of competitiveness and thereby, in terms of labour market performance.
To assess whether this is the case, we will analyse the trend behaviour
in structural unemployment before and after the estimated shocks.
Similarly to the introduction of the euro, the analysis of structural breaks
can help to determine whether, as a consequence of the crisis, structural
unemployment in European countries has increased.
Following Perron (1988) the method of least squares to estimate
the trend is likely to suffer from size distortions if a unit root is
present in the data. For example, if the data is modelled as a differ-
ence stationary process when it is actually a trend stationary process,
then the test will be inefﬁcient and lack power relative to the trend
stationary process (Perron and Yabu, 2009a). The presence of struc-
tural breaks further complicates the process, as neglecting a break in
an otherwise trend stationary process can lead to the conclusion of a
spurious unit root in the data (Perron, 1989), while ignoring a trend
break in a difference stationary process can lead the unit root test to
the false conclusion that the data is stationary (Leybourne et al.,
1998). Therefore, when using the approach to test for unit roots
while allowing for structural breaks in the trend function of the
underlying data, the inference drawn from the structural break test
on the level of the data depends on whether a unit root exists,
while the test based on differenced data can have poor properties
when the data contains a stationary component (Vogelsang, 1998).
This problem underscores the need to employ structural break tests
that allows one to be agnostic to the nature of serial correlation in
the data. To this end, we employ robust methods of Perron and
Yabu (2009b) and Kejriwal and Perron (2010) to determine
structural break points. Once the breaks (if any) are identiﬁed, we
demarcate regimes based on the number of break points. We then
proceed to estimate the trends for the individual unemployment
regimes identiﬁed by the break points. Where no breaks are found,
we estimate the trend over the entire sample. If we ﬁnd a single
structural break, we estimate the trends for the two regimes
demarcated by the break point. In the presence of two breaks,
three slope regimes are estimated.
The advantage of measuring the trends using the method of Perron
and Yabu (2009a) is that we can be completely agnostic about the un-
derlying order of integration of the data series, either for the individual
regimes or the entire sample. Motivated by these considerations, this
paper makes a robust detection of structural breaks, robust estimation
of the break locations and the trend of the regimes identiﬁed by the
estimated break dates. The euro crisis has also put on the top of the
European economic agenda the issue of high youth unemployment
and the need of implementing speciﬁc policy measures to cope with
it. Despite the political consensus about this need, some authors have
suggested that “it is not at all clear that young people suffer more
from being unemployed than older people, or even disproportionately
more than older unemployed individuals. In particular, it is not clear
that the much-publicised notion of a ‘lost generation’ with permanent
‘scars’ is relevant only to the young generation” (Barslund and Gross,
2013, p. 2). To shed some light on this issue, we will test for structural
breaks in both youth and adult structural unemployment to assess
whether the trend behaviour after the crisis is different between both
groups of unemployed.
On this point, our empirical results entail a variety of policy impli-
cations. The ﬁnding of structural breaks accompanied by statistically
signiﬁcant slope changes in the rate of unemployment can be associ-
ated to changes in the equilibrium rate of unemployment. In that
case, the standard policy recipe takes the form of structural reforms
to improve the institutional design and, thereby, help the perfor-
mance of the labour market. On the contrary, in the absence of
structural breaks, divergence from the equilibrium unemploymentrate should be managed preferably through demand-side and
growth oriented policies.1
The less standard andmore novel case, however, is the one in which
a different behaviour is identiﬁed for a different group (youth, adult)
in a given country. Although youth and adults may beneﬁt from
group-targeted policymeasures, they are all subject to the same general
institutional framework. This implies that generic recommendations in
terms of structural reforms may have to be complemented by more
speciﬁcmeasures. In viewof ourﬁndings, these complementary policies
ought to emphasise better educational records and improvement of
school-to-work transitions. In this way, youth would become less
prone to reduce their participation rates when the economy is hit by a
severe shock such as the Great Recession, and much less exposed to
become part of the ‘Not in Education Employment or Training’(NEET).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2
reviews the literature discussing the effects of both the single monetary
policy and the current economic crisis on unemployment. Section 3
presents the theoretical and empirical evidence on the different
behaviours of youth and adult unemployment rates. Section 4 discusses
how structural unemployment is obtained, whereas Section 5 explains
the methodology. The results are presented in Section 6 and discussed
in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2. Unemployment in Europe: the effects of EMU and the crisis
2.1. The euro
Under the traditional macroeconomic paradigm, we should not
expect any effect from the adoption of a single monetary policy on
unemployment since monetary policy is neutral in the long-run and
the creation of a monetary union is just a change in the monetary
regime. However, in order to join the monetary union, the countries
had to fulﬁl certain conditions, as the Maastricht Treaty, as well as the
Stability and Growth Pact once in the euro zone. The institutional
framework of the EMU imposed asymmetric relationships between a
centralizedmonetary policy, restricted national ﬁscal policies and unco-
ordinated wage policies. The design of the economic governance of the
euro and the deepening process of European integration zone inﬂu-
enced the European macroeconomic scenario, as well as the organiza-
tion and the functioning of European labour markets through changes
in the economic environment inwhich thesemarkets operate. The elim-
ination of exchange rate ﬂuctuations also led to a further increase in
product market integration, and intensiﬁcation of competition and reg-
ulation. In addition, the common currency increased price transparency,
exposing nationalﬁrms to a higher level of competition. All these factors
have certainly affected nominal wage and price settings.
Some authors have suggested that the EMU have also affected the
wage-bargaining setting through an increase in both national and trans-
national wage-bargaining coordination, although some others did point
out that this process would be rather dubious (Calmfors, 2001). Also,
Cukierman and Lippi (2001, p. 541) suggested that the EMU formation
reduced unions' perceptions of the inﬂationary repercussions of
their individual wages, inducing them to be more aggressive in their
wage demands.
Having lost an important stabilizing tool such as the monetary
policy, it has been argued that EMU countries have increased their
labour market ﬂexibility as a complementary mechanism to cope with
adverse shocks. This is in contrast to the view that a monetary union
can weaken the incentives for national labour market reform, since
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attempt to protect themselves from others' beggar-thy-neighbour
policies (Sibert and Sutherland, 2000).
Overall, the effects of the EMU on the national labour markets
remain a contentious issue calling for further analysis to conclude
whether the unemployment behaviour across euro zone countries
has changed as a consequence of the introduction of the single
currency or, rather, it is a phenomenon observed in some, but not all,
EMU countries.
2.2. The crisis
Another strand of the literature claims that the recent economic
crisis has had an unequal impact on the EU labour markets. As stated
above, periphery countries with serious debt sustainability problems
have been severely affected in terms of job destruction. In addition, as
suggested by Tridico (2013), those countries that pursued a model
based on ﬂexibility alone (Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom, for
example) experienced a worse labour market performance. Some of
the EU western countries (France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom) suffered a double dip, Greece and Ireland experi-
enced multiple dips, whereas the rest of the EU western economies
have had at least one year of output contraction. The question now is
whether the effects coming from the crisis have translated into structur-
al breaks on unemployment and for which countries.
The ﬁnancial nature of the crisis may have also an important role in
the behaviour of labour markets through the decline in output and in-
vestment associated with heightened uncertainty, higher risk premia,
and tighter lending standards (Hall, 2009). As suggested by Calvo et al.
(2012), ﬁnancial crises tend to be followed by jobless recoveries in the
presence of low inﬂation, and by signiﬁcant lower real wage
recoveries in the presence of high inﬂation. Persistent shocks in the
presence of jobless recoveries can lead to an increase in both long-
term and structural unemployment. Boeri et al. (2013) ﬁnd that
ﬁnancial recessions amplify labour market volatility and Okun's
elasticity over the business cycle.
Overall, the labour market impact of the crisis is still calling for
attention, especially with regard to its disaggregated impact by groups,
and its youth bias.
3. Unemployment in Europe: youth versus adult unemployment
Youth unemployment rates in the EU vary widely across countries
and regions and have been exacerbated during the crisis increasing
from 15.5% in 2007 to 23.5% in 2013, and being generally more than
twice as high as the adult unemployment rates. The latter can be partly
explained because of a smaller youth labour force. However, ofﬁcial
youth unemployment rates are also likely to be an underestimate
measure of the true problem since the discouraged worker effect
is higher for youngsters given that they can opt to continue their
education or simply livewith their families. These options reduce robust
search efforts if ﬁnding a job is difﬁcult, and can potentially lead to the
so-called NEET.
Youth unemployment responds to the same two main drivers of
(adult) unemployment, as discussed in Section 2; that is, business cycles
and the institutional setup as well as features of the labour market.
However, the impact of these factors can be different for youth and
adult unemployment. According to Ryan (2001), youth unemployment
tends to be super-cyclical, meaning that it is more sensitive to the
business cycle than adult unemployment. IMF (2014) reports that
cyclical factors explain 50% of the changes in youth unemployment
rate, while in stressed euro area countries the ﬁgure rises to 70%. The
sensitivity of youth unemployment to the business cycle can be
explained due to special features of youth employment, such as the
concentration of youth employment in cyclically sensitive industriesand in small- and medium-size enterprises (see OECD, 2006; Scarpetta
et al., 2010; European Commission, 2013).
Labour market characteristics can also have an impact on youth
unemployment for the following two reasons: First, youth population
have lower levels of human capital, skills and generic and job-speciﬁc
work experience. As a consequence, youth productivity is lower and
they are more exposed to long-term unemployment, unstable and
low-quality jobs, and perhaps social exclusion (OECD, 2005). In the
speciﬁc case of Europe, Pastore (2015) argues that the youth experience
gap is the key factor to understandwhyyouth unemployment in Europe
is much higher. Secondly, the institutional framework is also relevant
through the existence of dual labour markets and temporary jobs
(Bertola et al., 2007; Nunziata and Staffolani, 2007), hiring and
ﬁring regulations, minimum wages relative to the median wage and
ﬁring costs (Neumark and Wascher, 2004; Bernal-Verdugo et al.,
2012), unionization (Bertola et al., 2007), or the school-to-work-
transition (Ryan, 2001) and the university-to-work-transition
(Sciulli and Signorelli, 2011) institutions.
4. Data and computation of monthly structural unemployment
The data employed in this study consists ofmonthly observations for
overall, adult and youth unemployment in Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The source
of the data is Eurostat. The sample period runs from January 1993 to
September 2013. The choice of the start date January 1993 is based on
the fact that the data at this frequency is only available from this point
in time. Incidentally, the start date corresponds to the launch of the
common market within the European Economic Community.
Actual unemployment rates are traditionally decomposed into
‘structural’ and ‘cyclical’ unemployment. Structural unemployment is
the rate of unemployment that would be observed if the economy
were not hit by shocks (either demand or supply shocks), if inﬂation
were held at a low steady state, and the economy grew smoothly.
Hence, structural unemployment reﬂects a range of structural factors
such as the efﬁciency of the labour market, the demographic features
of the labour force, or the labour market institutions, and is attained
when the economy comes to rest at potential output. Cyclical unem-
ployment is the higher (lower) unemployment due to a recession (or
boom) and results therefore from shocks.
Following Shimer (2005), and subsequent studies, monthly struc-
tural unemployment in this paper is obtained using theHodrik–Prescott
(HP) ﬁlter. This approach opens up the issue of how the notion of struc-
tural unemployment can be best studied in an empirical sense. It is well-
known that a variety of related concepts – such as Natural Rate of
Unemployment, NAIRU, steady state, frictionless equilibrium – coexist
in the literature. A variety of methods, ranging from the estimation of
structural models to the ﬁltering of the unemployment series (using
various techniques), have been employed to provide empirical estima-
tions of these concepts. Here we use the HP ﬁlter for the following
two reasons.
First, the use of monthly data for 16 countries prevents considering
standard institutional controls used, for example, in ﬁve-years average
panel data estimation. Even the use of quarterly data would greatly
reduce the availability of suitable controls and, thus, the possibility of
using alternative methods. However, given that we are interested in
considering a meaningful period (our sample starts at the inception of
the European common market, the integration stage before the EMU),
using monthly data provides us with enough degrees of freedom to
conduct our analysis.
Secondly, a very popular strand of the literature using the
Diamond–Mortensen–Pissarides framework has proceeded in the
same way allowing us to compare our ﬁndings. The difference is
that in such search-and-matching models, à la Shimer (2005) and
beyond, it is the structural component that is removed from the
3 We conducted the analysis and the unbiased estimates are broadly the same; the re-
sults are available upon request.
4 It is important to note that the literature on unit root testing continues to develop so
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this studywe are interested in the structural part of the unemployment
rate series. Here it should be noted that the sensitivity of the results to
the HP ﬁlter is greatly reduced as it is the trend component that is
being retained and analysed. Moreover, irrespective of the method,
we are interested in comparing the outcome of our time series analysis
for the adult and youth unemployment rates across 16 economies. Thus,
comparability is granted provided the same method is used for the
different series, as it is obviously done here.
5. Econometric methodology
To estimate trends in unemployment data for the various countries
chosen in this study, we consider the following model:
UNEMPt ¼ α þ βtþ ut ; ut ¼ ψut−1 þ εt ; ð1Þ
where UNEMP denotes the unemployment rate, ut measures the devia-
tion from trend,which is described in this case as an AR(1) process.2 The
parameter β, which measures the trend, is the hypothesis of interest. If
the trend is signiﬁcant, that is, we rejectH0:(β=0), thenwe proceed to
observe (i)whether the trend is negative, that is (βb0), to conclude that
the unemployment rate has fallen over time, or (ii) whether the trend is
positive, that is (βN0), to conclude that the real unemployment rate has
increased over time.
Consider the model given by Eq. (1) where the error term is speci-
ﬁed as an AR(1) model. The weighted least squares (WLS) is calculated
using the following:
μW ¼∑u^t u^t−1= ∑u^2t þ 1=T∑u^2t
 
ð2Þ
where μW denotes the weighted least square estimate and T denotes
the total number of observations in the sample. Following Roy and
Fuller (2001), we obtain the unbiased estimates μ^UB , and following
Andrews (1993) the median unbiased estimates μ^MU are calculated.
Perron and Yabu (2009a) then obtain the following super-efﬁcient
estimate as follows:
μ^US ¼
μ^UB if μ^UB− 1
  N T−1=2
1 if μ^UB− 1
  ≤ T−1=2
(
ð3Þ
or,
μ^MS ¼
μ^MU if μ^MU − 1
  N T−1=2
1 if μ^MU − 1
  ≤ T−1=2
(
ð4Þ
where μ^US and or μ^MS are the super-efﬁcient estimates based on the
unbiased estimate and the median unbiased estimate respectively.
The Feasible Generalised Least Square (FGLS) procedure is applied
to obtain the estimate of the trend parameter β and construct the
FGLS t–statistic for the unbiased and median unbiased estimate;
that is, tβF(UB) and tβF(MU) respectively.
However, if the errors in Eq. (1) are a higher order than AR(1), the
estimate μ^ is obtained from the following regression:
u^t ¼ μu^t−1 þ∑
k
i¼1
ςiΔu^t−i þ etk ð5Þ
The lag length k is selected using theModiﬁed Akaike Information
Criterion (MAIC) following Ng and Perron (2001) with k allowing
to be in the range [0,12(T/100)1/4]. The weighted symmetric
least squares estimator μ^W is constructed for an AR(p) process2 This assumption is relaxed in the following econometric analysis to allow for a general
AR(p) process. To keep the description of the econometric methodology simple, we as-
sume an AR(1) process at this stage.[see Fuller (1996, p. 415)]. The truncated estimate μ^MU (median
unbiased estimator) or μ^UB (unbiased estimator) is then applied to
obtain the super-efﬁcient unbiased estimate μ^US or super-efﬁcient
median unbiased estimate μ^MS using Eq. (3) or Eq. (4) respectively.
Finally, the quasi-FGLS procedure is applied to obtain the estimate
of the trend parameter β and construct the Robust Quasi-FGLS t-sta-
tistic for the unbiased and median unbiased estimate, that is, tβ-
RQF(UB) and tβRQF(MU) respectively. Perron and Yabu (2009a) show
that for a similar sample size as chosen in this study, the tβRQF(MU)
has some liberal size distortions in comparison to the tβRQF(UB).
When ψ=1, tβRQF(MU) and tβRQF(UB) have similar power; however,
when ψ departs from unity tβRQF(MU) has comparatively higher
power. For brevity, in this paper we estimate the median unbiased
estimate only.3
So far, the economic literature have proposed and applied different
unit root tests with and without structural breaks. Usually we do not
know in advance whether the time series are affected by structural
breaks, which conditions the analysis that can be conducted using unit
root tests. Thus, if breaks are not accounted for when in fact they have
affected the time series, the unit root tests can be biased towards the
non-rejection of the null hypothesis of unit root. On the other hand,
allowing for inexistent breaks when computing the unit root tests can
imply reductions in the empirical power of the statistics. This issue
has been recently addressed in Perron and Yabu (2009b) allowing for
breaks in the level and slope of the trend function given by Eq. (1).
Perron and Yabu (2009b) ﬁnd that the exponential functional of the
Wald test has a limiting distribution that is nearly the same for both
I(0) and I(1) variables. Following Roy and Fuller (2001), a biased
corrected version of the least squares estimate of μ^ is carried out to
allow for good size and power properties in ﬁnite samples. Perron and
Yabu (2009b) design a test statistic — hereafter, the Exp−W break
test statistic — that allows to test if there is a structural break affecting
the time trend of the data series regardless of whether the series is
I(0) or I(1).4 The test is as follows:
Exp−W ¼ ln 1
T
∑ exp
1
2
W λð Þ
  
ð6Þ
where λ denotes the break fraction andWdenotes theWald statistic. In
this paper, we have computed the Exp−W break test statistic consider-
ing the model that allows for changes both in the level and the slope of
the time trend, which is the most general speciﬁcation.
In the spirit of Perron and Yabu (2009b), a sequential procedure is
proposed byKejriwal andPerron (2010) that allows one to obtain a con-
sistent estimate of the true number of breaks irrespective of whether
the errors are I(1) or I(0). The ﬁrst step is to conduct a test for no
break versus one break. Conditional on a rejection, the estimated
break date is obtained by a global minimization of the sum of squared
residuals. The strategy proceeds by testing each of the two segments
(obtained using the estimated partition) for the presence of an addition-
al break and assessing whether the maximum of the tests is signiﬁcant.
Formally, the test of one versus two breaks is expressed as:
ExpW 2j1ð Þ ¼ max1≤ i≤2 ExpW ið Þ
n o
ð7Þ
where ExpW(i) is the one break test in segment i. We conclude in favour
of a model with two breaks if ExpW(2|1) is sufﬁciently large.that the biases of the early test towards the non-rejection of the null hypothesis are re-
duced at the same time that there is no loss of power. An example of this newwave of unit
root tests is the one developed byNarayan and Popp (2010) allowing for structural breaks
in level and slope at unknown times.
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The full set of empirical results obtained from applying this
methodology is presented in the Appendix. The ﬁrst set of tables
shows the number of breaks and their corresponding dates for
the trend components of total unemployment (Table A1), youth
unemployment (Table A2), and adult unemployment (Table A3). In
each of the tables the exponential Wald test (ExpW) statistics are
calculated, ﬁrst allowing for one break using the Perron and Yabu
(2009b) test. If a break is found we then adopt the sequential break
test due to Kejriwal and Perron (2010). The number of breaks is
listed in the designated column in Tables A1 to A3 and the prepon-
derance of breaks is noted to fall around the introduction of the
EMU or the occurrence of the ﬁnancial crisis. Tables A4 to A6 show,
respectively, the slope changes in the individual regimes that are
demarcated by the structural breaks. What is interesting to note, is
that the results are varied with no common pattern. However, it is
clear that the sample period considered is characterised by broken
trends that could be positive, negative or insigniﬁcant. Given the
density of this information, Table A7 provides a qualitative summary
of the results presented in Tables A1 to A6. The results obtained raise
some signiﬁcant ﬁndings as follows.
First, the analysis based on the aggregate unemployment rate fails to
uncover signiﬁcant differences in the unemployment dynamics of the
youth and adult unemployment rates.
Secondly, we ﬁnd the existence of a similar number of structural
breaks when adult and youth unemployment rates are examined.
Therefore, there is no evidence that the trend component of the youth
unemployment rate is more responsive than the adult one. In other
words, differences between aggregate and youth unemployment take
the form of enhanced volatilities in response to temporary shocks
(as the literature has shown), but do not show up, as a general feature
across countries, in the form of different intensities in their response
to structural breaks.
Thirdly, a signiﬁcant ﬁnding is that a structural break occurred in the
aftermath of the Eurozone creation in January 1999 and affected adult
unemployment rates in the Continental European countries (Belgium,
Germany, Finland, Luxembourg, and Netherlands), together with
Portugal. Moreover, this break entailed a signiﬁcant slope change with
the exception of Belgium. Note that these are, in general, economies
that undertook signiﬁcant reforms at the time. For example, Germany
with the Act on part-time work and ﬁxed term employment relation-
ships (Gesetz uber Teilzeitarbeit und befristete Arbeitsvertrage) passed in
December 2000, followed by the Hartz reforms; the Netherlands
with the Part-Time Employment Act passed in February 2000 as partFig. 3. Youth particip
Source: Eurostat.of the framework Work and Care Act; or Finland with Act n. 55/2001
to reform the Employment Contracts Act or Act n. 944/2003 to create
individualised programmes for all long-term unemployed.
Regarding youth unemployment, Belgium, Germany and the
Netherlands also experienced a structural break with slope change,
while the rest did not. On the contrary, Southern European periphery
economies did not experience the EMU break in terms of unemploy-
ment. This group is made of the PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece
and Spain) plus France, but may also be deﬁned as including the
Club-Med countries together with Ireland. Our hypothesis is that this
cluster is made of the economies that experienced more pressure to
comply with the Maastricht Criteria, since they were economies with
a wider gap with respect to the leading ones (mainly in the Continental
European group).
Finally, Austria, which is not clustered with the Continental
European economies by the tests (neither when its youth or when its
adult unemployment rates are examined), and Luxembourg (clustered
with the PIIGS when the youth unemployment rates are examined),
record poor ﬁgures for youth unemployment (Fig. 2) between 1999
and 2014, even though they appear to do rather well in terms of adult
unemployment (Fig. 1). During these years, youth unemployment
doubled in Austria (from 5% to 10%) while it more than tripled in
Luxembourg (from 7% to 22%). If we add the PIIGS, we have the set of
economies where youth population has suffered the most with respect
to the unemployment problem in the Euro years.
Our results may be compared with those in Romero-Ávila and
Usabiaga (2008, 2009), who study the main unemployment paradigms
over the period 1976 to 2004 by employing panel stationarity tests due
to Camarero et al. (2006) and Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2005) allowing
for an unknown number of endogenous structural breaks. While their
chosen time-period does not match with our study, interestingly, the
timing of the breaks around 1999 is reﬂected in both studies. As noted
by Romero-Ávila and Usabiaga (2009), their methodology requires
elimination of endpoints (due to a 15% trimming) preventing them
from detecting structural breaks associated with some institutional
reforms aimed at making European labour markets more ﬂexible
which took place after 1999.
The second major structural break took place around 2008 with the
onset of the worldwide Financial Crisis and the subsequent Sovereign-
Debt crisis in the Eurozone countries. This break, in contrast to the
EMU one, is found to severely affect the Club-Med countries, France
and the PIIGS (with the exception of Portugal), together with Austria
and the Netherlands. This is the group of economies with a structural
break affecting their adult unemployment rates and causing signiﬁcant
slope changes in the corresponding new unemployment regimes. Onation rates (%).
Fig. 4. NEET in 2013.
Source: International Labour Ofﬁce.
448 A. Ghoshray et al. / Economic Modelling 58 (2016) 442–453the contrary, Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg have not experienced
a regime change, while the one in Finland was not signiﬁcant. The ab-
sence of Netherlands in this group is explained by the fact that a
relatively large part of the economic shock was translated into
unemployment (de Graaf-Zijl et al., 2015).
This result may be connected with the intensity of the Sovereign-
Debt crisis. Together with Portugal, whose labour market has always
evolved remarkably well relative to the Spanish one, which is very
similar (see Blanchard and Jimeno, 1995), the Club-Med countries
are the ones that have suffered the Great Recessionmore intensively.
Note that these are, precisely, the economies that did not embark
in institutional reforms at the start of the EMU period and were,
thus, less prepared to compete without the possibility of currency
devaluations. In the absence of such reforms and divergence in the
degree of competitiveness (as indicated, for example, by the evolu-
tion of the real unit labour costs as it has been shown by Ordóñez
et al., 2015), they became highly indebted economies; ﬁrst at the
private level, then at the public one, so that the impact of the Great
Recession was reﬂected, among other things, in new and higher
unemployment rate regimes.
The most salient result regarding this second major shock is related
to the youth unemployment rates, which show a complete absence ofFig. 5. PISA sco
Source: OECDevidence that the Euro and Financial crisis break has caused a regime
change in this segment of the labour market. Although, at ﬁrst sight, it
would be tempting to see this result as positive (to the extent that larger
structural youth unemployment rates seem to have been avoided), we
claim that it brings truly bad news.
The reason of our pessimist assessment lies on the fact that al-
though youth are not as much caught into long-term unemployment
as adults, they may end up in a worse situation. The ﬁrst reason is
that the youth have the possibility of temporarily leaving the labour
market, as they have done in response to the crisis. As shown in
Fig. 3, the youths in the EU have reduced their participation rates
more intensively in the economies where youth unemployment
has worsened (recall Fig. 2). This is clearly the case of the PIIGS and
Luxembourg, which is the country with the lowest youth participa-
tion rate (26%), then followed by Italy. Further, it should be noted
that some of the most affected economies had much higher partici-
pation rates in 1999 (Ireland 54%, Portugal 47%, Spain 43%) than
today, and even that these participation rates were close to the
ones in Germany (stable at around 50%) and larger than in Belgium
or France (where they are below 40%).
The second reason why youth may ﬁnd that their situation deterio-
rates, is that a signiﬁcant proportion of them may abandon theres. 2012.
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA).
Fig. 6. PIAAC scores. 2012.
Source: OECD Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC).
449A. Ghoshray et al. / Economic Modelling 58 (2016) 442–453education system. The growing relevance of this phenomenonhas given
rise to a signiﬁcant increase of the NEET, especially in the economies
most affected by the crisis (see O'Higgins, 2015). As shown in Fig. 4,
this group accounts for around 20% of the persons between 15 and
24 years old in Spain, Greece and Italy, followed by Ireland and
Portugal with values around 15%.
7. Discussion and policy implications
Youth unemployment is one of the most worrying legacies of the
Great Recession (O'Higgins, 2015). One approach to discuss possible
solutions to reduce this problem is to evaluate the speciﬁc effectiveness,
for the youth, of active labour market policies (ALMPs). An extensive
appraisal along these lines has recently been conducted in Caliendo
and Schmidl (2016). Another approach is to rely on macro-oriented
analysis, such as ours, to elucidate which economies seem to be in
need of more intensive structural reforms and whether these reforms
should be designed more generically (i.e., for all groups) or more
targeted towards some speciﬁc groups.
However, general conclusions from macro-oriented analyses are
based on the ﬁnding of cross-country asymmetries (for example, in
terms of salient increases in structural unemployment rates), and result
in economic policy recipes at the country level. This is the case of
the studies by Fosten and Ghoshray (2011) or Srinivasan and Mitra
(2014). For a given country (that is, in a situation in which labour
market institutions and regulations are basically shared by both youth
and adults), in case of signiﬁcant group asymmetries, general policy
recipesmay be of a limited effectiveness. This is the case of the structur-
al break related to the Euro/Financial crisis, which caused a signiﬁcantTable 1
Summary of the EMU break.
Eurozone countries
With structural break
and regimes with
signiﬁcant trend
With structural break
and regimes with
insigniﬁcant trend
With no
structural
break
Adult Germany, Finland, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal
Belgium Austria, France, G
Ireland, Italy, Spa
Youth Belgium, Germany, Ireland,
Netherlands
Austria, France,
Greece
Finland, Italy, Lux
Portugal, Spainimpact on structural adult unemployment in some economies, but did
not cause a (signiﬁcant) structural break in any country in terms of
youth unemployment.
Given the associated fall in participation rates and the increases
in the youth NEET, we claim that it is essential to complement gener-
ic institutional measures with policies that enhance and improve
transitions from the educational system to the labour market. This
claim emerges from recognizing the close correlation between
those economies having experienced the worse performance of
youth unemployment along the Euro and Financial crisis, and those
displaying the worst performance on the PISA scores (displayed in
Fig. 5). In addition, we can also signal the case of Sweden, which is
close to the bottom in PISA scores (after having fallen successively
wave after wave), and has experienced a clear increase from 12% to
23% in youth unemployment.
Of course, one could argue that this is just a one-off observation,
but we can extend this analysis to the PIAAC scores, which reﬂect
the average qualiﬁcation level of the adult population. Since adult
population is composed of different cohorts having exited from the
educational system in different decades, a positive correlation in this
case would probably reﬂect a more structural relationship between
the structural performance of the educational system and the labour
market resilience to shocks.
As shown in Fig. 6, the PIAAC scores show that the Club-Med econ-
omies are those at the bottom position. At the top of the scale, in con-
trast, we ﬁnd the Netherlands and Finland, two of the economies with
youth unemployment rates that have not changed much between
1999 and 2014 in clear contrast with the PIIGS (recall Fig. 2). Also,
most Scandinavian countries are perched in the upper position and,Countries not in the Eurozone
With structural break
and regimes with
signiﬁcant trend
With structural break
and regimes with
insigniﬁcant trend
With no
structural
break
reece,
in
Norway Sweden U.K., Denmark
embourg, Sweden, U.K. Norway, Denmark
Table 2
Summary of the euro/ﬁnancial crisis break.
Eurozone countries Countries not in the Eurozone
With structural break
and regimes with
signiﬁcant trend
With structural break
and regimes with
insigniﬁcant trend
With no
structural
break
With structural break
and regimes with
signiﬁcant trend
With structural break
and regimes with
insigniﬁcant trend
With no
structural
break
Adult Austria, France, Greece,
Ireland, Italy,
Netherlands, Spain
Finland Belgium, Germany,
Luxembourg, Portugal
U.K. Denmark Norway, Sweden
Youth Belgium Austria, Belgium, Germany,
Finland, France, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain
U.K. Denmark, Norway,
Sweden
450 A. Ghoshray et al. / Economic Modelling 58 (2016) 442–453coincidentally, do not display any sort of youth unemployment problem
(with the already mentioned exception of Sweden).
Note, that if we had not conducted a time series analysis separately
for youth and adult unemployment rates, we would not have identiﬁed
the structural breaks in youth unemployment as consequence of the
Euro and Financial crisis. It is this ﬁnding of the preponderance of breaks
around these two signiﬁcant events, that has allowed our analysis to
move beyond the standard policy recommendation of implementing
structural reforms, and instead focus on the consequences that poor
qualiﬁcations and a poor performance of the educational system may
have for the performance of the labour market. These complementary
policies would help to surpass recession periods by minimizing the
social and economic costs of youth unemployment and protracted
periods of moving out of education and training.5
Related to this discussion, and also connected to the age composition
of the workers, the long-term unemployment problem appears as a
critical complementary issue. For example, the Netherlands (whose
adult unemployment rate appears together with the PIIGS in Table 2)
has faced worse long-term unemployment rates than its neighbours.
As explained in de Graaf-Zijl et al. (2015), 40% of these unemployed
workers are over 50 years old. In contrast, in Denmark (which in
Table 2 is classiﬁed as not experiencing a signiﬁcant structural
break in adult unemployment) most unemployment spells are short,
and there are no worrying signs of long-term unemployment
(Andersen, 2015). Therefore, although youth unemployment is a
critical problem, we should not disregard the adverse effects of
long-term unemployment on adult population.
8. Conclusions
Aggregate unemployment hides signiﬁcantly different behaviours in
adult and youth unemployment. As a consequence, speciﬁc attention
needs to be devoted to these two components of unemployment. This
paper makes a concerted analysis to analyse these two components
separately for various EU countries. Novel methods are employed to
detect structural breaks and the preponderance of these breaks are
associated to two major single-event shocks occurred in Europe in
recent times: the inception of the EMU in 1999 and the Euro and
Financial crisis that took place in the aftermath of the burst of the
housing and ﬁnancial bubbles in 2008.
We ﬁnd that the structural break associated to the EMU is limited to
those economies less affected by the Euro and Financial Crisis. This is in
general the case for both adult and youth unemployment rates. In
contrast, the structural break associated to the Euro and the Financial
Crisis had greater impact on those economies with very poor aggregate5 Lack and/or shortage of data prevents us from conducting meaningful time series
analysis on the causality between indicators of educational performance and youth unem-
ployment or youth labour force participation. A panel data analysiswould compensate the
short time-series with cross-section observations; however, embarking in such a comple-
mentary quantitative analysis exceeds the scope of this ‘stepping stone’ paper.labourmarket performance such as Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain. This
underscores one of the main conclusions of this study. Economies in
the European periphery were to some extent inattentive in preparing
themselves for the new scenario brought by the EMU. They were active
and successful in securing nominal convergence ex-ante, but the lack
of real convergence (for example, in competitiveness, as shown by
Ordóñez et al., 2015) caused very different impacts of the Great
Recession on their labour markets.
Nevertheless, in general, youth unemployment rates did not
experience signiﬁcant structural breaks across Europe as a result of
the Euro and Financial crisis. This conﬁrms the well-known enhanced
volatility of youth unemployment vis-à-vis adult unemployment, and
leads us to conclude that underlying this wider volatility there is the
possibility, for youth, of responding to shocks without experiencing
shifts in structural unemployment. Lower involvement in the labour
market (fallingparticipation rates), and lower involvement in education
activities (growingNEETs)would be alternative or complementary out-
comes to the shifts in structural unemployment experienced by the
adult section.
We have also claimed that the relative behaviour of youth unem-
ployment across countries is highly associated to the relative
performance of the educational system. Although this is not new in
the literature, we have uncovered this association as a potentially
structural phenomenon, since this seems to hold not only for the
youth, but also for adult education. To the extent that adult education
involves several generations, this creates a persistent mechanism by
which poor educational levels end up affecting labour market perfor-
mance in extenso. Microeconomic studies have warned us on the social
and economic risks of individuals leaving the educational system at
the early stages in their life. Here we complement this fact with an
additional warning that emerges from the long lasting effects of a
poor educational system: poor educational levelsmay harm extensively
the performance of the labourmarket. That underlines one of our major
conclusions: the educational system is a crucial tool to help restoring
socially acceptable youth unemployment rates, which today
remain stubbornly at an average of 20% in the Eurozone. We believe
this area deserves much more attention from a macroeconomic point
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Table A1
Results for structural breaks tests. Total trend component.
Country Test statistics Breaks location
ExpW Exp W
(2|1)
No. of
breaks
EMU Euro/ﬁnancial
crisis
Other
Belgium 1.25 1.70 2 2011m7 2001m1
Denmark −0.25 0
Germany 12.24 8.44 2 1999m5 2011m7
Ireland 1.21 15.15 2 1999m7 2006m6
Spain 3.86 4.42 2 1999m10 2007m4
France 3.57 5.16 2 2000m9 2004m2
Italy 0.89 0
Holland 0.29 0
Austria 2.49 8.42 2 2000m4 1997m2
Portugal 12.20 1.34 1 2003m3
Finland 16.79 2.53 2 2001m5
1996m4
Norway −0.14 0
Sweden 0.85 0
Luxembourg 3.52 12.15 2 2007m6 1996m4
UK 1.71 15.19 2 1999m12 2011m7
Greece 7.80 −0.04 1 2001m2
Note: The second and third columns present respectively the Perron and Yabu (2009a)
test for one break in the trend (ExpW) and the Kejriwal and Perron (2010) test of one ver-
sus two breaks (ExpW (2|1)). The conclusion of both tests is shown in the fourth column.
The last three columns show the location of the breaks.
Table A2
Results for structural breaks tests. Youth trend component.
Country Test statistics Breaks location
ExpW Exp W
(2|1)
No. of
breaks
EMU Euro/ﬁnancial
crisis
Other
Belgium 3.31 13.55 2 2001m3 2011m7
Denmark −0.16 0
Germany 8.47 8.69 2 1999m8 1996m4
Ireland 1.15 29.27 2 1999m8 1996m4
Spain −0.22 0
France 5.03 0.23 1 2001m8
Italy 8.10 0.13 1 1997m10
Holland 2.54 2.90 2 2000m2 2003m12
Austria 3.96 66.92 2 2000m4 1997m2
Portugal 11.68 0.14 1 2002m6
Finland 16.41 0.47 1 2002m1
Norway 0.004 0
Sweden 3.20 3.56 2 2000m2 2005m8
Luxembourg 0.24 0
UK 14.12 11.52 2 2000m1 2011m5
Greece 10.15 16.09 2 2001m10 2004m4
Note: The second and third columns present respectively the Perron and Yabu (2009a,
2009b) test for one break in the trend (ExpW) and the Kejriwal and Perron (2010) test
of one versus twobreaks (ExpW(2|1)). The conclusion of both tests is shown in the fourth
column. The last three columns show the location of the breaks.
Table A3
Results for structural breaks tests. Adult trend component.
Country Test statistics Breaks location
ExpW Exp W
(2|1)
No. of
breaks
EMU Euro/ﬁnancial
crisis
Other
Belgium 19.56 67.65 2 2000:6 1996:9
Denmark 42.97 98.56 2 2007:5 1997:2
Germany 134.26 73.95 2 2001:8 2004:12
Ireland 69.56 163.68 2 2011:7 2004:11
Spain 213.03 46.01 2 2011:7 2006:11
France 56.11 105.48 2 2007:9 1996:9
Italy 155.02 99.15 2 2008:4 1997:8
Holland 33.17 159.83 2 2000:4 2010:10
Austria 15.85 159.48 2 2008:9 2003:10
Portugal 30.08 91.06 2 2001:2 1996:3
Finland 138.06 170.16 2 2000:6 2007:12
Table A3 (continued)
Country Test statistics Breaks location
ExpW Exp W
(2|1)
No. of
breaks
EMU Euro/ﬁnancial
crisis
Other
Norway 166.65 135.82 2 1999:2 2003:2
Sweden 18.68 227.16 2 2000:11 1997:2
Luxembourg 65.77 148.82 2 2001:2 2004:6
UK 86.85 277.44 2 2011:7 2003:6
Greece 272.82 42.64 2 2007:1 2003:12
Note: The second and third columns present respectively the Perron and Yabu (2009b)
test for one break in the trend (ExpW) and the Kejriwal and Perron (2010) test of one
versus two breaks (ExpW (2|1)). The conclusion of both tests is shown in the fourth
column. The last three columns show the location of the breaks.
Table A4
Slope estimates. Total trend component.
Country Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3
Belgium −0.057
(−0.0791,−0.0355)
0.0634
(0.0406, 0.0862)
−0.1923
(−0.4155, 0.0309)
Denmark −0.0401
(−0.313, 0.2328)
Germany −0.1318
(−0.2237,−0.0398)
0.0034
(−0.0038, 0.0107)
0.1231
(−0.2254, 0.4761)
Ireland −0.0803
(−0.1120,-0.0485)
−0.0024
(−0.0073, 0.0024)
0.047
(0.0339, 0.0601)
Spain −0.0025
(−0.0687, 0.0638)
−0.0382
(−0.057,−0.019)
0.0367
(0.0004, 0.0729)
France −0.0382
(−0.101, 0.0253)
−0.01
(−0.0177,−0.0023)
0.0493
(0.0384, 0.0603)
Italy 0.0068
(−0.0126, 0.0262)
Holland 0.0126
(−0.0186, 0.0438)
Austria −0.0327
(−0.1037, 0.0383)
−0.0568
(−0.1961, 0.0826)
0.0006
(−0.009, 0.103)
Portugal −0.0486
(−0.0989, 0.0016)
0.0856
(−0.7175, 0.8887)
Finland −0.068
(−0.1689, 0.033)
−0.0491
(−0.0541,−0.0441)
0.015
(0.013, 0.0169)
Norway −0.0207
(−0.2098, 0.1684)
Sweden −0.024
(−0.0655, 0.0174)
Luxembourg −0.0948
(−0.1966, 0.0071)
−0.0068
(−0.0346, 0.021)
0.0236
(0.0166, 0.0305)
UK −0.0711
(−0.1419,−0.0003)
0.0109
(0.000, 0.0217)
0.1564
(0.0128, 0.3001)
Greece −0.0176
(−0.0362, 0.0010)
0.0010
(−0.0083, 0.0103)
Note: This table shows the change in the slope of the trend as a consequence of the
estimated structural breaks. Numbers in parentheses denote 90% conﬁdence intervals.
Signiﬁcant slope estimates denoted in bold.
Table A5
Slope estimates. Youth trend component.
Country Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3
Belgium −0.0836
(−0.1087,−0.0585)
0.143
(0.0045, 0.2832)
−0.6128
(−1.572, 0.3471)
Denmark −0.0786
(−0.4808, 0.3236)
Germany 0.1273
(−0.3571, 0.1025)
−0.7138
(−1.08,−0.3475)
0.0855
(0.039, 0.1315)
Ireland −0.203
(−0.2699, 0.2107)
−0.4511
(0.7622,−0.1401)
0.0726
(0.0149, 0.1304)
Spain 0.0423
(−0.0579, 0.1426)
France −0.1006
(−0.1391,−0.0621)
0.1962
(−0.1359, 0.5283)
Italy −0.0528
(−0.1055,−0.0001)
−0.0598
(−0.0956,−0.0239)
Holland −0.0908
(−0.3418, 0.16)
0.0711
(0.062, 0.0802)
0.163
(0.0392, 0.2869)
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Table A5 (continued)
Country Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3
Austria 0.413
(0.0827, 0.7443)
0.0108
(−0.4104, 0.432)
−0.0074
(−0.0304, 0.0155)
Portugal −0.1567
(−0.2456,−0.0677)
0.1236
(−0.2859, 0.5332)
Finland −0.0736
(−0.0861,−0.0611)
0.0032
(−0.0744, 0.0809)
Norway −0.0329
(−0.3081, 0.2422)
Sweden −0.1729
(−0.3496, 0.0038)
0.1184
(0.0896, 0.1473)
0.0147
(−0.0251, 0.0546)
Luxembourg 0.0416
(−0.009, 0.0924)
UK −0.1105
(−0.263, 0.0418)
0.0379
(0.0339, 0.0419)
0.0103
(−0.1533, 0.1739)
Greece 0.0533
(−0.239, 0.128)
0.0853
(−0.168, 0.338)
0.0032
(−0.0112, 0.0176)
Note: This table shows the change in the slope of the trend as a consequence of the
estimated structural breaks. Numbers in parentheses denote 90% conﬁdence intervals.
Signiﬁcant slope estimates denoted in bold.
Table A6
Slope estimates adult unemployment.
Country Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3
Belgium 0.0295
(0.023, 0.028)
−0.0457
(−0.047,−0.044)
0.008
(−0.009, 0.025)
Denmark −0.085
(−0.094,−0.075)
−0.015
(−0.026,−0.001)
0.025
(−0.009, 0.061)
Germany 0.005
(−0.008, 0.018)
0.048
(0.033, 0.064)
−0.046
(−0.076,−0.016)
Ireland −0.071
(−0.130,−0.0118)
0.119
(0.100, 0.137)
−0.085
(−0.088,−0.0817)
Spain −0.055
(−0.142, 0.031)
0.233
(0.127, 0.34)
0.061
(0.041, 0.08)
France 0.019
(0.016, 0.021)
−0.021
(−0.056, 0.012)
0.028
(0.025, 0.031)
Italy 0.041
(0.035, 0.046)
−0.024
(−0.044,−0.003)
0.072
(0.061, 0.083)
Holland −0.032
(−0.036,−0.028)
0.008
(0.002, 0.014)
0.062
(0.06, 0.064)
Austria 0.004
(−0.019, 0.028)
−0.009
(−0.012,−0.006)
0.015
(0.008, 0.022)
Portugal 0.042
(0.034, 0.048)
−0.033
(−0.063,−0.0025)
0.054
(0.034, 0.073)
Finland −0.069
(−0.078,−0.060)
−0.027
(−0.033,−0.021)
0.019
(−0.004, 0.044)
Norway −0.044
(−0.045,−0.044)
0.018
(0.013, 0.023)
−0.0001
(−0.019, 0.018)
Sweden 0.023
(0.018, 0.028)
−0.073
(−0.132,−0.013)
0.005
(0.0002, 0.01)
Luxembourg −0.005
(−0.07, 0.06)
0.049
(0.044, 0.055)
0.011
(0.006, 0.016)
UK −0.042
(−0.053,−0.032)
0.024
(−0.019, 0.068)
−0.042
(−0.051,−0.032)
Greece 0.063
(−0.041, 0.167)
−0.035
(−0.041,−0.031)
0.208
(0.181, 0.236)
Note: This table shows the change in the slope of the trend as a consequence of the
estimated structural breaks. Numbers in parentheses denote 90% conﬁdence intervals.
Signiﬁcant slope estimates denoted in bold.
Table A7
Qualitative summary of the results in Tables A1–A6.
Country EMU break Euro/ﬁnancial crisis break
Total Adult Youth Total Adult Youth
Belgium No No Yes Yes No No
Denmark No No No No No No
Germany Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Ireland Yes No Yes Yes Yes No
Spain Yes No No Yes Yes No
France Yes No No No Yes No
Italy No No No No Yes No
Holland No Yes Yes No Yes No
Table A7 (continued)
Country EMU break Euro/ﬁnancial crisis break
Total Adult Youth Total Adult Youth
Austria Yes No No No Yes No
Portugal No Yes No No No No
Finland No Yes No No No No
Norway No Yes No No No No
Sweden No No Yes No No No
Luxembourg No Yes No Yes No No
UK Yes No Yes Yes Yes No
Greece Yes No No No Yes No
Note: Yes stands for structural break with statistically signiﬁcant change in the trending
behaviour of unemployment.
452 A. Ghoshray et al. / Economic Modelling 58 (2016) 442–453References
Andersen, T.M., 2015. The Danish ﬂexicurity labour market during the Great Reces-
sion. De Economist 163, 473–490.
Andrews, D.W.K., 1993. Tests for parameter instability and structural change with
unknown change point, Econometrica. Econometric Society 61 (4), 821–856.
Barslund, M., Gross, D., 2013. Unemployment is the scourge, not youth unemployment
per se: the misguided policy preoccupation with youth. CEPS Policy Briefs. Centre
for European Policy Studies, Brussels.
Bean, C.R., 1994. European unemployment: a survey. J. Econ. Lit. 32 (2), 573–619.
Bernal-Verdugo, L.E., Furceri, D., Guillaume, D., 2012. Labor market ﬂexibility and
unemployment: new empirical evidence of static and dynamic effects. Comp.
Econ. Stud. 54, 251–273.
Bertola, G., Blau, F.D., Kahn, L.M., 2007. Labor market institutions and demographic em-
ployment patterns. J. Popul. Econ. 20 (4), 833–867.
Blanchard, O.J., 2006. European unemployment: the evolution of facts and ideas. Econ.
Policy 5–59 (January).
Blanchard, O.J., Jimeno, J.F., 1995. Structural unemployment: Spain versus Portugal. Am.
Econ. Rev. 85 (2), 212–218.
Blanchard, O.J., Summers, L.H., 1986. Hysteresis and the European unemployment prob-
lem. In: Fischer, S. (Ed.), NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1986. MIT Press, Cambridge,
MA.
Blanchard, O.J., Summers, L.H., 1987. Hysteresis in unemployment. Eur. Econ. Rev. 31,
288–295.
Boeri, T., Garibaldi, P., Espen, M.R., 2013. Financial shocks and labor: facts and theories.
IMF Econ. Rev. 61, 631–663.
Caliendo, M., Schmidl, R., 2016. Youth unemployment and active labor market policies in
Europe. IZA J. Labor Policy 5 (1), 1–30.
Calmfors, L., 2001. Wages and wage-bargaining institutions in the EMU — a survey of the
issues. Empirica 28 (4), 325–351.
Calvo, G.A., Corelli, F., Ottonello, P., 2012. The labormarket consequences of ﬁnancial crisis
with or without inﬂation: jobless and wageless recoveries. NBERWorking Paper No.
18480. National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
Camarero, M., Carrion-i-Silvestre, J.L., Tamarit, C., 2006. Testing for hysteresis in unem-
ployment in OECD countries. New evidence using stationarity panel tests with
breaks. Oxf. Bull. Econ. Stat. 68, 167–182.
Carrion-i-Silvestre, J.L., del Barrio, T., López-Bazo, E., 2005. Breaking the panels: an appli-
cation to the GDP per capita. Econ. J. 8, 159–175.
Cukierman, A., Lippi, F., 2001. Central bank independence, centralization of wage
bargaining, inﬂation and unemployment: theory and some evidence. Eur. Econ. Rev.
43 (7), 1395–1434.
De Graaf-Zijl, M., van der Horst, A., van Vuuren, D., Erken, H., Luginbuhl, R., 2015. Long-
term unemployment and the Great Recession in the Netherlands: economic mecha-
nisms and policy implications. De Economist 163, 415–434.
European Commission, 2013. Labor Market Developments in Europe 2013. European
Economy 6/2013.
Fosten, J., Ghoshray, A., 2011. Dynamic persistence in the unemployment rate of OECD
countries. Econ. Model. 28 (3), 948–954.
Fuller, W.A., 1996. Introduction to Statistical Time Series. 2nd Edition. Wiley 978-0-471-
55239-0.
Hall, R.E., 2009. By how much does GDP rise if the government buys more output?
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program 40. The Brookings
Institution, pp. 183–249 (2 (Fall)).
IMF, 1999. Chronic unemployment in the Euro area: causes and cures. World Economic
Outlook, May 1999. IMF.
IMF, 2014. Youth unemployment in Europe: Okun's law and beyond. IMF Country Report
No. 14/199. IMF.
Kejriwal, M., Perron, P., 2010. A sequential procedure to determine the number of breaks
in trend with an integrated or stationary noise component. J. Time Ser. Anal. 31,
305–328.
Layard, R., Nickell, S.J., Jackman, R., 1991. Unemployment, Macroeconomic Performance
and the Labour Market. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Leybourne, S.J., Mills, T.C., Newbold, P., 1998. Spurious rejections by Dickey–Fuller tests in
the presence of a break under the null. J. Econ. 87, 191–203.
Ljungqvist, L., Sargent, T.J., 1998. The European unemployment dilemma. J. Polit. Econ.
106 (3), 514–550.
Narayan, P.N., Popp, S., 2010. A new unit root test with two structural breaks in level and
slope at unknown time. J. Appl. Stat. 37 (9), 1425–1438.
453A. Ghoshray et al. / Economic Modelling 58 (2016) 442–453Narayan, P.K., Smyth, R., 2004. Crime rates, male youth unemployment and real income in
Australia: evidence from Granger causality tests. Appl. Econ. 36 (18), 2079–2095.
Neumark, D., Wascher, W., 2004. Minimum wages, labor market institutions, and youth
employment: a cross-national analysis. Ind. Labor Relat. Rev. 57 (2), 223–248.
Ng, S., Perron, P., 2001. Lag length selection and the construction of unit root tests with
good size and power. Econometrica 69 (6), 1519–1554.
Nunziata, L., Staffolani, S., 2007. Short-term contracts regulations and dynamic labour de-
mand: theory and evidence. Scot. J. Polit. Econ. 54 (1), 72–104.
OECD, 2005. Education at Glance. OECD Publishing.
OECD, 2006. Boosting jobs and growth. OECD Employment Outlook. OECD Publishing
(Chapters 3 and 7).
OECD, 2011. Persistence of high unemployment: what risks? What policies. OECD Eco-
nomic Outlook Vol. 2011/1. OECD Publishing.
OECD, 2014. An update of the labour market situation. OECD Employment Outlook. OECD
Publishing.
O'Higgins, N., 2015. Youth unemployment. IZA Policy Papers No. 103. IZA, Germany.
Ordóñez, J., Sala, H., Silva, J.I., 2015. Real unit labour costs in Eurozone countries: drivers
and clusters. IZA J. Eur. Labor Stud. 4 (1), 1–19.
Pastore, F., 2015. The youth experience gap: explaining national differences in the school-
to-work transition. Springer Briefs in Economics. Springer (ISBN 978-3-319-10195-
8).
Perron, P., 1988. Trends and random walks in macroeconomic time series: further evi-
dence from a new approach. J. Econ. Dyn. Control. 12, 297–332.
Perron, P., 1989. The great crash, the oil price shock and the unit root hypothesis.
Econometrica 57, 1361–1401.
Perron, P., Yabu, T., 2009a. Estimating deterministic trends with an integrated or station-
ary noise component. J. Econ. 151, 56–69.
Perron, P., Yabu, T., 2009b. Testing for shifts in trend with an integrated or stationary
noise component. J. Bus. Econ. Stat. 27 (3), 369–396.Phelps, E.S., 1994. Structural Slumps: The Modem Equilibrium Theory of Unemployment,
Interest, and Assets. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, p. 1994.
Romero-Ávila, D., Usabiaga, C., 2008. On the persistence of Spanish unemployment rates.
Empir. Econ. 35, 77–99.
Romero-Ávila, D., Usabiaga, C., 2009. The unemployment paradigms revisited: a compar-
ative analysis of US States and European unemployment. Contemp. Econ. Policy 27
(3), 321–334.
Roy, A., Fuller, W.A., 2001. Estimation of autoregressive processes with a root near one.
J. Bus. Econ. Stat. 19, 482–493.
Ryan, P., 2001. The school-to-work transition: a cross-national perspective. J. Econ. Lit. 39
(1), 34–92.
Scarpetta, S., Sonnet, A., Manfredi, T., 2010. Rising youth unemployment during the crisis:
how to prevent negative long-term consequences on a generation? OECD Social, Em-
ployment and Migration Working Papers, No. 106. OECD Publishing
Sciulli, D., Signorelli, M., 2011. University-to-work transitions: the case of Perugia. Eur.
J. High. Educ. 1 (1), 39–65.
Shimer, R., 2005. The cyclical behavior of equilibrium unemployment and vacancies. Am.
Econ. Rev. 95 (1), 25–49.
Sibert, A., Sutherland, A., 2000. Monetary union and labour market reform. J. Int. Econ. 51,
421–435.
Srinivasan, N., Mitra, P., 2014. The European unemployment problem: its cause and cure.
Empir. Econ. 47 (1), 57–73.
Tridico, P., 2013. The impact of the economic crisis on EU labour market: a comparative
perspective. Int. Labour Rev. 154 (2), 175–190.
Valadkhani, A., Smyth, R., 2015. Switching and asymmetric behaviour of the Okun coefﬁ-
cient in the US: evidence for the 1948–2015 period. Econ. Model. 50, 281–290.
Vogelsang, T.J., 1998. Trend function hypothesis testing in the presence of serial correla-
tion. Econometrica 66, 123–148.
